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Abstract: The food distribution and retail sectors in Quebec are highly concentrated and 
integrated as large food distributors are also involved in food retailing.  As such, they are 
competing with small grocery and convenience stores they sell inputs to.  A review of the 
industry suggests that there are important economies of size in distribution, but that smaller 
stores offering convenience face a more inelastic demand.  Concerns over the survival of smaller 
stores in Quebec have motivated two types of regulations. The first type aims at reducing the 
cost advantage of dominant retailers by restricting the number of employees that they are 
allowed to use during specific time periods.  The second type restricts retail prices.  We develop 
a simple model capturing the main features of the industry to ascertain the impact of these 
regulations on retail and wholesale prices.  Our results suggest that these regulations reduce 
welfare and may induce both tighter margins and lower surplus for small retailers.    
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Seemingly Competitive Food Retail Regulations: 
 Who Do They Really Help? 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Market power has been a perennial issue in agri-food markets.  The existence of many Canadian 
institutions, like marketing boards and state-trading agencies, has been motivated to a large extent 
by concerns for “competitive” family farm operators and their ability to obtain “fair” prices in 
dealing with large input suppliers, processors and traders.  A few years ago, questions were raised 
about the market power of processors and retailers when beef retail prices failed to follow the 
spectacular drop in cattle prices caused by the discovery of a “mad” cow.  In this case as in many 
others, it was the welfare of farmers, and not so much that of consumers, that prompted calls for 
investigation and intervention.  However, concerns about small firms and the welfare 
implications of deeper vertical integration are also manifest at the food retail level.  In this paper, 
we analyze the effect of two regulations designed to help small grocery stores and convenience 
stores compete against large distributors forwardly integrated in the food retail business.  To do 
so, we rely on a simple fixed-proportions model of forward vertical integration involving large 
food distributors selling to and competing with small independent food retailers.  While our 
forward integration model shares many features with the classic models of Riordan (1998) and 
Salop and Scheffman (1987), it produces significantly different results that have interesting 
policy implications for the food retail business.        
In the province of Quebec, a law adopted in 1992 forced large food retailers to limit to 
four the number of employees working after 21:00 on week days and after 17:00 on Saturdays 
and Sundays as well as on designated holidays.  The law was slightly relaxed on December 13
th 
of 2006 by changing the trigger hour from 17:00 to 20:00.  When the law was being drafted, it 
had been expected that large food retailers would reduce their business hours rather than operate   3
with only four employees, the number of employees commonly used in small stores.
1  Thus, the 
purpose of the law was to improve the ability of small grocery stores and convenience stores to 
compete in a market dominated by a few large-scale food retailers.  It had been hoped that easing 
the competition over specific time periods would improve the profitability of small firms and in 
the end enhance overall competition.  Contrary to the government’s expectation, large food 
retailers responded to the regulation by extending their business hours, betting that long lines at 
the check-out would create less inconvenience for their customers than shorter business hours.  
The law is controversial.  On the one hand, large retailers would like more flexibility and have 
challenged it by having more than four employees working during holidays.  Metro, Loblaw-
Provigo and IGA also distributed 300000 post-cards (with pre-paid postage and a bilingual list of 
arguments for more flexibility) to make it easier for their customers to complain to the elected 
members of Quebec’s National Assembly.
2  Small stores and unions called for an end to the four-
employee rule and requested that shorter business hours be imposed on large retailers.  The added 
flexibility from the 2006 modification to the law has not settled the issue because large grocery 
stores openly challenge the law by having more than four employees during holidays.
3  Our 
model shows that raising the cost of large food retailers through restrictions on the number of 
employees allowed to work after certain hours is bad for consumers and can actually be bad for 
small retailers as well, the group the law is meant to protect. 
  The second restriction pertains to setting minimum retail prices for certain products like 
milk and beer.  It was hoped that the imposition of minimum retail prices on certain items would 
prevent large scale retailers to eject smaller stores out of the market, but we show that a minimum 
retail price may exacerbate the aggressive behavior of the integrated distributor toward 
independent retailers.    4
The next section discusses vertical integration in the distribution and food retail sectors in 
Canada.  Similarities and contrasts between Quebec and other provinces are highlighted.  This 
sets up the stage for the description of our model in section 3.  Section 4 analyzes the effects of 
artificially increasing the marginal retail cost of large retailers through regulations.  Section 5 
investigates the effect of imposing a binding minimum price in small retail outlets.  Section 6 
summarizes our main results and dwells on the unintended consequences of government 
interventions meant to protect the “small”, like the convenience stores and small independent 
grocery stores at the retail level, or the small family farms at the primary production level.  
 
2. VERTICAL INTEGRATION, FOOD DISTRIBUTION AND RETAIL 
Vertical integration has been and still is a phenomenon of empirical significance that has spurred 
many debates over the years.
4  The food distribution and retail sectors in Canada are generally 
highly concentrated and integrated. Loblaws, Metro and Sobeys/IGA are the three major food 
retailers and distributors in Quebec.
5 The retail market in Quebec differs from its counterpart in 
Ontario. Supermarket sales in Quebec (Ontario) in 2005 amounted to $14.25 (21.45) billions 
while convenience stores/dépanneurs and specialized food stores sold for $3.48 (2.65)  billions.
6  
These statistics unmistakably show that supermarkets get a much larger share of every dollar 
spent on food in Ontario than in Quebec and the difference is going to get only larger with 
increases in the number of Walmart’s superstores in English Canada.
7  Different factors can 
explain the relative importance of smaller stores in Quebec.  The fact that beer is still strictly sold 
in beer stores in Ontario is a major impediment to the growth of convenience stores.  In Quebec, 
supermarkets and convenience stores are allowed to sell beer and a limited selection of wines, but 
these items represent a much larger share of total sales for convenience stores.  It is also worth   5
pointing out that patronizing specialized shops, like butcher shops and pastry shops, seems more 
common in Quebec, probably because of the French heritage in that province.  
The major players’ importance and strategies vary across provinces.  For example, a large 
national food distributor like Sobeys currently has 343 corporate stores and 43 franchised stores 
in Atlantic Canada as opposed to 16 (71) corporate stores and 341 (118) franchised stores in 
Quebec (Western Canada).  There are economies of scale in food distribution and this is why 
there are so few firms.  Even Canada’s largest distributor, Loblaws, has undergone a significant 
“supply chain restructuring to a more efficient network of fewer, butt larger facilities (Loblaws, 
2005 p.3).  These economies of scale originate from various sources.  First, the development of 
computerized inventory management systems has made it easy to handle very large volumes of 
perishable products.  Second, fewer firms can better optimize the location and product mix of 
distribution centers to reduce handling and transport costs.  For example, Metro has 4 warehouses 
for grocery products and 2 for meats.  Third, there is the simple, yet very germane, issue of 
lumpiness in the transport of food.  This is especially important for stores located in less 
populated areas.  For such cases, it costs very little at the margin for a distributor to “completely 
fill the truck” and supply their corporate or franchised grocery store as well as competing stores 
at the same time.  As a result, large food distributors have agreements amongst themselves to 
exploit logistic efficiency.   
Large food distributors supply many different types of stores and the relationships 
between the stores and the distributors vary.   For example, Metro supplies 576 supermarkets in 
Quebec and Ontario (under the Metro, SuperC, Loeb, Food Basics and A&P banners), 225 
smaller grocery stores (119 Marché Richelieu, 97 Marché Ami, 9 The Barn) and 289 convenience 
stores Gem.  In all, it supplies 2000 small-surface stores of which 800 are under one of its 
banners (eg., SOS Dépanneur, Marché Extra, Servi Express).  It also supplies several drugstores   6
(e.g., Brunet and CliniPlus).
8   Loblaws is similarly involved, having various kinds of agreements 
with stores it supplies.  It is stated in its 2005 annual report that it supplies 670 corporate stores, 
402 franchised stores, 472 associated stores in addition to having 7858 independent accounts!   
The convenience store business has changed tremendously over the years in Quebec and 
in the rest of Canada.  The most important change has been the emergence of Couche-Tard as the 
largest Canadian convenience retailer and the third largest in North America.
9  Couche-Tard is 
now big enough to manage its own distribution network, but it is a recent phenomenon, as it is 
only in 2002 that its new distribution center located in Montreal became operational.  Still, the 
dominance of the top 3 distributors over distribution and retail remains unquestioned because of 
their size.   
At the retail level, the major players across Canada are increasingly relying on very large 
stores to offer more products and services, perhaps in response to Walmart’s superstores and to 
Costco stores.  Loblaws has made major investments in its Ontario superstores
10 and Metro 
significantly invested in its largest outlets, like Super C (48 in 2002 against 56 in 2005) and 
Metro Plus stores.  Sobeys did the same in Quebec with its IGA Extra stores.  In fact, the ratio of 
investment in buildings by food stores as opposed to general merchandise stores was higher in 
Canada than in the United States in 2005.
11 Bigger retail stores appeals to busy consumers who 
can buy a wide range of products under one roof.  Corner stores cater to consumers who “don’t 
want to drive on the other side of town” to get a few staples.  As such, both types of stores offer 
convenience in their own way. Because consumers differ in terms of their location relative to the 
closest corner store and supermarket and in terms of their appreciation for selection and the 
opportunity cost of their time, it is safe to assume that corner stores and supermarkets face 
different yet related demand functions.   
            7
3. PARTIAL FORWARD VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND THE INCREASING 
DOMINANCE OF LARGE RETAILERS  
Large food distributors are forwardly integrated in the retail business, but their integration is 
partial as they compete with smaller retailers they sell inputs to. The literature on vertical 
integration has distinguished two sets of cases, depending on whether the input requirement per 
unit of output is fixed or variable with the level of output.  In the case of food distribution and 
retail, the fixed-proportion assumption is most appropriate because more often than not retailers 
have only to unpack the goods delivered by the distributor.  The fixed-proportion assumption 
remains valid even when some packaging must be done by retailers.  Most textbooks, as early as 
Needham (1969) and as recently as Church and Ware (2000), discuss a fixed-proportion case in 
which downstream production is accomplished with a widely available constant (average) cost 
technology and upstream production is controlled by a monopolist.  The appeal of this case is that 
it demonstrates that forward vertical integration can be pointless; the non-integrated monopolist 
being equally able to exploit the downstream demand as it would under an integration scenario.
12  
If the upstream monopolist was able to secure a better constant cost technology for downstream 
production, it would fully integrate by displacing or purchasing all of the competitive firms.  
Given this “razor’s edge” effect, which is observed in other models as well, one must appeal to 
regulations to rationalize the existence of a partial integration outcome
13 or give up on the 
constant unit cost assumption as Bonroy and Larue (2007).  Partial integration and the small 
number of distributors characterize the distribution/retail industry in Quebec.  In order to shed 
some light of recent issues, we develop a model with n forwardly integrated food distributors, 
each selling a quantity  i q at the retail level and supplying a quantity  i x to small price-taking 
retailers with whom they have exclusive contracts.             8
A few large food distributors share the upstream market (distribution) and are involved in 
the downstream market (retail) as well. As such, each distributor is the sole input supplier for its 
own fringe of small retailers with which it competes at the retail level. For simplicity, a 
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stores,  j q  is the volume sold by supermarket j and γ  is a parameter capturing the extent of 
product differentiation between corner stores and supermarkets. All small retailers are assumed to 
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≡∑  and Z is an aggregator for all other goods and services. Our quasi-linear function 
allows us to restrict our analysis to a partial equilibrium framework and to appeal to standard 
surplus measures to make inferences about welfare changes.
14 By definition, consumer surplus is 
given by: CS U PQ RX Z ≡− − −=
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BQb XQ X γ ++  and it is increasing in both Q and X. 
The above set of inverse demand functions give rise to kinked demand functions.  For example, 
the demand facing large retailers can be written as: 
() ,0 , ,
A P
QPR M a x M i n P R
B
αη κ
⎧− ⎫ ⎛⎞ =− + ⎨⎬ ⎜⎟
⎝⎠ ⎩⎭









   9
because there is a critical price P below which only large retailers remain. However, we will 
assume throughout that there are strictly positive demands for both types of stores.     
Each firm involved in retailing activities relies on a fixed-proportion technology.  The 
goods purchased by retailers from the distributor are referred to as inputs and one unit of input is 
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marginal cost of larger retailers can be upward sloping, constant or downward sloping while that 
of small competitive retailers is strictly increasing.  When  0, cd δ = = , large and small retailers 
share the same technology characterized by decreasing returns.  Cost advantages could be given 
to large retailers, as in Riordan (1998) or Bonroy and Larue (2007) who showed that partial 
forward integration by a upstream monopolist is consistent with moderate cost advantages and 
cost disadvantages in downstream/retailing activities. We assume that the cost of distributing 










 so as to 
accommodate decreasing, constant and increasing returns in distribution services.           
Each individual retailer is too small to have market power and it is assumed that these 
small retailers are not capable of exercising jointly any market power.  The supply curve of small 
retailers supplied by distributor i is denoted by  (,) i SR r and it is defined by:
15 










ii i i R rx x K
δ
π ≡− − − , where  i K  is a fee levied by the distributor i to get part or all of 
the profit made by the small retailers it contracts with.
16  This fee is usually paid upfront and can 
be seen as a sunk cost. Because it impacts only on the distribution of rents between small retailers   10
and distributors and not on the aggregate level of rents, it does not impact on our subsequent 
results. Because of the fixed-proportion assumption, the supply of the small retailers is 
conditioned by the price differential R-r.  As such it is increasing in the retail price, 
() ./ 1 / iR i xx Rδ ≡∂ ∂ = , declining in the input price,  ( ) ./ 1 / ir i xx r δ ≡∂ ∂ =−  and  iR ir x x = − , 
0 iRR irr iRr xx x === .  The second order condition simply requires that  0 δ > .   
Distributor  i entertains Cournot conjectures about rival distributors and knows the 
technology used by small retailers as well as the demand function for their product. It can invert 
the supply relation in (1) and use the market demand facing small retailers to obtain a price 
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The first order conditions describing the choices about quantities to be sold in large and small 
retail outlets by distributor i are: 
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The second order condition requires that  () ( ) ( )
2 22 2 2 0 Hf B f d b f γδ ≡ −+ + + + + + > . We 
will assume throughout that the expressions ( ) 2B fd + +  and ( ) 22 bf δ ++  are strictly positive.    11
Thus, the second order condition constrains the substitution parameter γ  in the demand functions 
not to be too large in absolute value relative to the own-price parameters B and b.  Because we 
posit that large retailers face a more elastic demand than small ones, we assume that: 
0 bBγ >>>  and aA > .  The second order condition allows for decreasing and moderately 
increasing returns in distribution as f can be positive or negative. Assuming that an interior 
solution exists to make the above inequalities hold with equality and that firms are symmetric 
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conditions as follows:  
  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 0 Ace B n d fq n fx γ − −− +++ − ++ = (5) 
  ()() () ( ) ( ) 11 2 0 ae n fq b n fx γδ −− ++ − ++ + =  (6) 
  
These two equations can be solved to find the equilibrium solutions for q and x:   
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Partial integration is a “natural” outcome in this model and competition regulations do not need 
to be invoked, as in Quirmbach (1992), to justify the presence of small independent retail stores 
in the market.
17  To see this, consider an example in which the distributor has the same retail 
technology as the small retailers.  More specifically, let  0, 0.2, cd δ = == and in line with our 
assumption that large retailers face a more elastic demand than the small retailers, we set   
10, 14, 0.35, 1, 0.2 AaB b γ === = =  and have decreasing returns in distribution,  0, 0.1 ef == . 
Figure 1 shows how retail quantities q and x change as the number of distributors increases.    12
Naturally, more distributors mean that each distributor sells smaller quantities through its retail 
outlets and through smaller retailers.  The interesting aspect of this example is that it does not 
appeal to cost advantages or economies of size in retail to rationalize the larger market share of 
integrated retailers.  The point is not contest the “real-life” existence of a cost advantage for large 
retailers, but to neutralize its effect on sales to gain some intuition.  Thus, by construction small 
and large retailers have the same technology and the predominance of integrated retailers is 
demand-driven to reflect that “low prices” bring consumers in large grocery stores while the need 
for “convenience” insures that small retailers have customers. It is worth noting that the relative 
importance of small retailers decreases with the number of distributors.  Put differently, large 
integrated grocery stores capture a larger share of the retail market as competition intensifies 
between distributors.  The demand faced by large integrated retailers being more elastic than that 
of small retailers implies that n*q grows faster than n*x as the number of distributors increases.  
Even though we do not have a location model, a parallel can easily be made in the sense that 
increases in the number of supermarkets decreases the demand for “convenience”.  This helps 
explains the increasingly dominant position of large integrated retailers, which could be further 
enhanced by technological changes favoring larger outlets. Naturally, prices in large and small 
retail outlets decrease with the number of distributors in our example. We can infer that the 
presence of new players like Wal-Mart in the Canadian food retail business contributes to keep 
food prices low by competing with existing large and small retailers for customers.  In this light, 
Loblaw’s massive investments to improve efficiency in distribution and the lobbying efforts 
made by small retailers to obtain accommodating regulations are not surprising.     
Even though the quantities sold be large and small retailers, the q and x expressions, are 
rather messy, we can exploit the simplicity of our model through standard comparative statics 
that will help us derive results about changes in equilibrium quantities and prices.     13
LEMMA 1:  i) changes in sales in response to changes in demand parameters: 
() ( ) /2 2/ 0 , / 2/ 0 , qA b fH xA fH δγ
<
∂∂ = + + >∂∂ = − +
> () /2 / 0 , qa fH γ
<
∂∂ = − +
>
     
( ) /2 / 0 , xa B dfH ∂∂ = ++ > () ( ) () () /2 2 2 1 / 0 , qf q b f x n H γγ δ
> ⎡⎤ ∂∂ = + − + + + ⎣⎦ <
() ( ) () ( ) /2 2 1 / 0 , xf x B d f q n H γγ ⎡⎤ ∂∂ = + − ++ + < ⎣⎦ ( )( ) /1 / 0 , qB n q qA ∂∂ = − + ∂∂< ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦
() ( ) /1 / 0 , xB n q xA
<
∂∂ = − + ∂∂ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ > () ( ) /1 / 0 , qb n x qa
>
∂∂ = − + ∂∂ ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ <
( ) ( ) /1 / 0 xb n x xa ∂∂ = − + ∂∂< ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦ , where  () ( ) ( )
2 22 2 2 0 Hf B f d b f γδ ≡ −+ + + + + + > ;  
ii) changes in sales in response to changes in large retailers’ cost: 
/ / 0, / / 0, qc qA xc xA
>
∂∂ = − ∂∂ <∂∂ = − ∂∂





iii) changes in sales in response to changes in the small retailers’ cost: 
() () /2 / 0 , /2 / 0 qx q a xx x a δδ
>
∂ ∂ =− ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ =− ∂ ∂ <
<
; iv) changes in sales in response to changes 
in distributing cost:  ( ) ( ) ( )( ) // / 0 , // / 0 , qe qA xA xe xa qa ∂∂ = − ∂∂− ∂∂<∂∂ = − ∂∂− ∂∂< 
( )( ) ( )( ) // 0 , // 0 qf qx qe xf qx xe ∂∂ =+ ∂∂<∂∂ =+ ∂∂< .  
PROOF: See the appendix. 
      Upward shifts in the intercept of the demand faced by large (small) retailers increase the sales 
of large (small) retailers and have ambiguous effects on the sales of small (large) retailers.  An 
increase in the substitution parameter γ  has an ambiguous effect on sales by large retailers, but a 
negative effect on sales by small retailers.  Making the slope of the demand faced by large (small) 
retailers more inelastic, or increasing B (b), tends to reduce the sales of large (small) retailers, but 
it has an ambiguous effect on the sales of small (large) retailers.  The results with respect to “c” 
are about shifts in the marginal retailing cost for large integrated stores.  An increase in “c” 
decreases the volume sold by larger retailers and it may increase or decrease the volume sold by   14
small retailers.  Riordan (1998) and Bonroy and Larue (2007) used this parameter to define a 
“cost advantage/disadvantage” for a large retailer and to define bounds separating corner 
solutions from equilibria involving forward partial integration or the coexistence of a large 
integrated firm and a fringe of small  ones.  As in these papers, it can be shown that large retailers 
with a cost advantage over small retailers need not eject small retailers and similarly large 
distributors need not exit the retail business even when they have a cost disadvantage.  An 
increase in “d” makes large retailers’ marginal cost steeper and this too tends to decrease the 
volume sold by large retailers and the effect of small retailers is ambiguous.  An increase in δ  
makes the marginal cost of small retailers steeper and this in turn depresses the sales of small 
retailers while having an ambiguous effect on the sales of large retailers.  Finally, increases in the 
intercept and in the slope of the marginal distributing cost reduce both q and x.    
  The large number of ambiguities in lemma 1 highlights the importance of vertical linkages 
between distribution and retail activities.  Even though large and small retailers compete for 
consumers, their cost and hence behavior is very much affected by the characteristics of the 
technology used in distribution.  Lemma 2 below shows how retail prices and the price paid by 
small retailers change as the levels of sales by large and small retailers change.   
LEMMA 2: Given symmetric firms: i) If  ( ) ( ) 0, 0 dq dx >< ><  then  ( ) ( ) 0, 0 dP dR < >< >  and 
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>
<















 and  () 0 dP R − > ;  dr dR dx xd δ δ =− − .iv) Changes in welfare are given by: 
() ( ) dW Bq x dQ bx x q dX γδ γ =+ + + + , where Qn q ≡  and  X nx ≡ .   15
PROOF: Parts i)-iii) follow from the assumption of symmetric firms which allow us to express 
prices in large and small retail outlets as : P AB n q n x γ = −− and Rab n x n q γ = −−.  The results 
are obtained by differentiating these equations with respect to q and x.  Part iv) rests on the 
definition of welfare, which is simply the sum of consumer surplus, 
22 11
22
CS BQ bX QX γ =++ , 





nA c e Q B QX Q
nn
ππ γ






ae X b X
n











++ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ =− − − + +− − + −+ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟
⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 and 
() ()
df f f f




⎡+ ⎤ ⎡ + ⎤ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎞ = − −− + − + + −−+ − + ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎟ ⎢⎥ ⎢ ⎥ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎠ ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦
.  
From (5) and (6), we find that () ( ) () Bd f f




++ + ⎛⎞ ⎛ ⎞

















.  Inserting these expressions in the welfare 
change expression, we get:  () ( ) dW Bq x dQ bx x q dX γδ γ =+ + + + .    QED    
  Obviously, welfare increases (decreases) when both Q and X increase (decrease). If 
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4. REGULATING THE NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES OF LARGE RETAILERS   
As argued in the introduction, the purpose of the Quebec law limiting the number of employees 
allowed to work after 20:00 on weekends and after 21:00 on week days in large grocery stores is 
to make small food retailers and convenience stores more competitive.  It was hoped that large   16
food retailers would close early and let smaller stores benefit from captive consumers.  This 
would have in turn allowed small retailers to better withstand the competitive pressures from 
large distributors/retailers.  Regulations, like taxes, can be used to create asymmetries between 
firms that may be welfare-enhancing (e.g., Salant and Shaffer, 1999; Larue and Gervais, 2002). A 
restriction on the use of an input is tantamount to forcing a more expensive set of inputs to 
produce the same quantity of output.  Accordingly, its effect differs from that of a tax.  This is 
illustrated in Figure 2 which for simplicity is based on a two-input Cobb-Douglas technology.  
We assume that the inputs are labour (x-axis) and an aggregate input (y-axis).  Three isoquants 
are drawn for levels of output q=3,4,5.  Given a factor price ratio, the unrestricted expansion path 
is a straight line emanating from the origin.  It is defined by the points of tangency between the 
isoquants and the isocost lines.  Our labour/number of employee restriction implies that 
additional increases in output can only be achieved by increasing the level of the aggregate input 
once the maximum number of employees allowed has been reached.  This rationalizes the kink 
and the vertical segment of the restricted expansion path.  In our example, the labour restriction 
starts binding at output level q=3.  Beyond this level of output, increases in output are more 
costly under the regulation.  This can be readily seen by comparing the (long-dashed) isocost line 
that is just tangent to the isoquant for q=4 to the (small-dashed) isocost line above it that cuts the 
isoquant and the restricted expansion path.  These isocost lines are associated with costs of 9.27 
and 9.65, for a ratio of 1.04.  Therefore, the restriction “shifts” the marginal cost curve.   
Comparing the isocost lines to produce q=5, we get 11.88 and 13.39 for the unrestricted and 
restricted cases for a ratio of 1.13.  Clearly, as the output to be produced increases, the marginal 
rate of substitution increases and the restriction becomes increasingly costly.  As a result, the 
slope of the marginal cost curve increases.  In our model, these effects boil down to increases in 
parameters “c” and “d” that pertain to the intercept and slope of the marginal cost of large   17
retailers.  From lemma 1, the effects of “d” on q and x are proportional to the effect of “c”.  
Therefore, we can concentrate our attention on the effects of “c” to understand the effects of the 
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The price in large retail stores necessarily increases, which is what one would expect from firms 
with market power facing higher costs.  The effect on prices paid by consumers in small retail 
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The above expression is positive if there are economies of size (i.e.,  0 f < ) because b γ > , but it 
can be negative when there are diseconomies of size and the degree of substitution between 
products sold in large and small retail outlets (i.e., γ  is small relative to b).  The notorious cost 
predation effect of Salop and Scheffman (1983, 1987) predicts that a partially-vertically 
integrated dominant firm may find it profitable to increase the cost of fringe firms.  In our case, 
the input price of small retailers can increase or fall in response to an improvement in the cost 














PROPOSITION 1: Consumer surplus and welfare fall in response following a regulation-
induced upward shift in the marginal cost of large retailers.     18
PROOF: From Lemma 1, 
22 2 Qb f X f
nn
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 and totally differentiating 
consumer surplus,  ( ) dCS BQdQ bXdX XdQ QdX γ =+ + + = ( ) ( ) dQ BQ X dX bX Q γ γ ++ +.  Let 
us assume that  0 f > ,  ,, 0 , Aa Bb c dδ ≈≈ =≈  and hence that QX ≈ .  In this instance, consumer 






. Naturally, if we assume that large retailers 
have a dominant position, QX  , then consumer surplus will fall even more in response to an 
increase in “c”.  An increase in “c” lowers the profit of the integrated firms and given that 
consumer surplus falls, welfare must decrease.  To see this, we can apply lemma 2 to show that 
welfare falls provided  ()
()
bx x q qx






.  This inequality is clearly satisfied when 
/0 xc ∂∂ < or when x is small relative to q (e.g, consider  0 x → ) which is consistent with the 
stylized facts of food retail in Canada.  However, let us assume again that  A a ≈   bB ≈ , 
0, cd δ ==  and qx ≈ , then the welfare condition becomes 
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which clearly holds when f is small . For example, if f=0, the inequality boils down to 
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 is equivalent to  ( ) ( )
2 22 2 bb f f b δ γδ + +> + +. Given that 
2 22 Bb γ > , 
a sufficient condition for welfare to fall is ( ) 20 bf − >  which simply means that the distribution 
technology is not characterized by rapidly decreasing returns!   QED    
   19
The above proposition states that the cost disadvantage arising from the regulation is to 
the detriment of consumers.  This is obvious when both P and R increase, but less so when the 
price level in small and large retail stores move in opposite directions.  The point is that the 
potential reduction in price applies to a smaller volume of goods than the increase in the price of 
large integrated retailers.  Therefore, the regulation does not have the pro-competitive effect it 
was intended to have as the response from small retailers cannot make up for the increase in the 
price in large retail outlets.  In Salant and Shaffer (1999), regulation or policy-induced cost 
asymmetries on Cournot oligopolists increase welfare when the cost increases forced on some 
firms are offset by cost reductions for other firms, so as to keep the sum of marginal costs 
constant.  In our case, the marginal cost of small retailers remains unchanged and this is why 
welfare necessarily goes down.  Figure 3 relies on the same parameters as Figure 1, except that 
“c” is allowed to vary.  It illustrates the reduction in welfare caused by a tightening of the 
regulation on the number of employees.  We can also see that competition matters as welfare in 
the presence of 4 integrated distributors is roughly 19% higher than in the case with 2 integrated 
distributors. In this example, the welfare effect of competition slowly decreases as the regulation 
becomes tighter (i.e., “c” increases).        
 
PROPOSITION 2: The effect of the cost-increasing regulation has ambiguous effect on the 
margin of small independent retailers. If returns in distribution activities are increasing enough, 
then the regulation induces a decrease in the small retailers’ margin.   20





.  If  0 f >  
(decreasing returns in distribution), then the small retailers’ margin widens and more so when n is 










. QED   
The above proposition tells us that the small retailers’ margin may increase or decrease.  
The higher marginal cost of large retailers makes small stores a relatively more appealing outlet 
for distributors.  Under decreasing returns (or slowly increasing returns: 20 f δ +> ) in 
distribution, distributors will want to widen the margin of small retailers to insure that their sales 
increase.  However, if economies of size in distribution are large enough or the marginal cost of 
small retailers increases slowly (20 f δ +<), the increase in average distribution cost brought 
about by the regulation-induced drop in the sales of large retailers will incite distributors to 
tighten the margin of small retailers.  “Margin squeezes” were once seen as irrational by antitrust 
authorities (see Schmalensee, 1973, p.449).  Clearly, our result rests on a specific condition that 
may or may not be realistic even though the food distribution industry is known to have 
economies of size.  Still, Schmalensee’s contention that squeezes can be consistent with profit 
maximization finds support in our analysis.              
It had been hoped by the Quebec government that a portion of the retail demand 
relinquished by large retailers could be acquired by small retailers.  From lemma 1, we can see 








.  The 
output (and the surplus, if it is not acquired by distributors) of small retailers is conditioned by 
their margin R-r and therefore the factors driving the ambiguity in both cases are similar.  In the 
presence of large economies of size in distribution, the regulation may cause a reduction in the   21
margin and sales of the very group it was meant to protect!  In the absence of economies of size 
in distribution, the regulation induces a widening of the small retailers’ margin and an increase in 
sales, but welfare still falls.  The removal of the regulation would bring about deeper forward 
integration and higher welfare.  This is not necessarily at odds with the literature which indicates 
that the welfare consequences of deeper integration are generally mixed.  In Salop and 
Scheffman’s (1987) model, backward integration is anti-competitive.  In Riordan’s (1998) 
backward integration case, deeper integration has ambiguous welfare effects. Mixed results can 
also be found for cases of forward vertical integration cases under variable proportions 
technologies (e.g., Vernon and Graham, 1971; Schmalensee, 1973; Westfield, 1981 and Chung, 
1984). 
 
5. A MINIMUM PRICE IN SMALL RETAIL OUTLETS 
Small retailers have limited space that they must manage carefully.  Convenience stores in 
Quebec devote a lot of space to alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages.  Specifically, beer and 
milk are important items.  Historically, surpermarkets have aggressively priced these items and 
this is why the Quebec government felt obliged to step in and regulate prices.  The Régie des 
Marchés Agricoles et Alimentaires du Québec (RMAAQ) sets minimum and maximum prices for 
various types of milk (3.25%, 2%, 1%, 0% fat) for different sizes of containers (l litre, 2 litres, 4 
litres) for 3 regions.  Small retailers continue to make representations before the RMAAQ to let it 
be known that price wars over milk are still eating up their margins.
18   
Minimum prices for beer vary according to the alcohol contents and container sizes.  Still 
small grocery stores continue to lobby for higher minimum beer prices, targeting provincial 
ministries and agencies that might support their quest.
19  The stated purpose of the minimum 
prices is to prevent supermarkets from using predatory pricing strategies against small retailers.    22
Theoretically, conditions supporting equilibrium predatory prices usually revolve around capital 
market imperfections (e.g., Tirole, 1988:377-379) whose significance are questionable in the 
Canadian retail context.  Furthermore, we have shown that small retailers are generally 
“convenient” for consumers and distributors. If the purpose of minimum prices is not to insure 
the survival of small retailers, then what are they for and what are their consequences? Even 
though our model allows for only two goods, it can nevertheless shed some light on the issue.   
To gain some intuition regarding the impact of a binding minimum price, consider its 
effect in a standard Cournot model with a linear demand for a homogenous product and no cost.  










⎝⎠ ∑ , where the outputs 
of rival firms are considered as given.  Accordingly, there is multiplicity of possible equilibria.  
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.  In our model, the distributors choose the volume of sales of both small and large 
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     (10)      
Given that distributors have Cournot conjectures, they take the quantities of rival firms as fixed 
and the above residual demand defines a simple restriction on a distributor’s sales in small retail 
stores in terms of its sales in its large retail stores.  In setting its sales in large stores, the   23
distributor must keep in mind that:  ( ) ./ / 0
R










 which provided a strictly positive supply, can be inverted to yield: 
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If distributors are symmetric, 
11
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== , then the above first order condition can be expressed as:   
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The second order condition requires that: -G<0, where 
( ) ( ) ( )
23 2 12 Gn b Bb nb f n f γγ γ δ ⎡⎤ ≡+ − + + + + ⎣⎦ >0. The parameters for the slopes of the 
demand functions which governs the speed at which marginal revenues fall must be large enough 
to counter potential economies of size (f<0) and product substitution effects (γ ). Solving for the 
equilibrium level sales by large retailers, we obtain:   24
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The symmetric equilibrium level of sales by small retailers is obtained by replacing “nq” in the 
following equation: 




= .   
PROPOSITION 3: An increase in the minimum price in small retail stores (R
min) reduces the 
volume sold by small retail stores, but it has an ambiguous effect on the volume sold by large 
retailers. 
PROOF: Given that  ()
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2 bf f nq
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 and from the residual demand linking the volume 
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.  The effect on the sales of large retailers can be ascertained by noting 
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.  QED   
Since distribution activities are known to be characterized by increasing returns even at 
high levels of outputs, the above proposition indicates that a binding minimum price in small 
retail stores is likely to trigger a reduction in the volume sold by small and large stores.   When 
this happens, welfare must decrease according to lemma 2 as distributors endowed with market 
power that were distributing too little without the price regulation end up distributing even less.  
In fact, the reductions of both nq and nx insure that both retail prices increase, an outcome which   25
is bad for consumers. Welfare goes down because the price restriction in small retail stores 
diminishes the degree of competition at the retail level. 
  
PROPOSITION 4. An increase in a binding minimum price in small retail stores bring about a 
“margin squeeze” on small retailers.           
PROOF: Given that 
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.  QED  
 
The margin squeeze in proposition 4 arises because of a significant cost predation effect.   
Hastings and Gilbert (2005) recently uncovered empirical evidence of cost predation effects 
induced by vertical integration in the petroleum/gasoline industry in the United States. The 
structure of this industry resembles that of the food distribution/retail industry as a few very large 
refineries supply their own retail outlets as well as non-integrated retailers.  Our results suggest 
that small stores’ recriminations about being squeezed by integrated distributors are likely to be 
grounded.                           
  
6. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
The food distribution and retail sectors are highly concentrated and integrated.  Large distributors 
are forwardly integrated in the retail business and as such compete with small retailers they sell 
inputs to.  The stylized facts about the industry are that there are economies of size in distribution 
and that larger retail stores have a cost advantage over smaller stores.  The concentration build up 
in distribution and the increasing size of retail outlets are the outcome of long term trends. For   26
years, small retailers concerned about their margin (and survival) and have asked the government 
to intervene.  In the province of Quebec, the government decided to restrict the number of 
employees that large retailers are allowed to use during certain hours.  The purpose of this 
regulation is to reduce the cost advantage of larger retailers.  It was hoped that large food retailers 
would prefer to close rather than to operate with a much reduced staff and that smaller stores 
would become more profitable.  Naturally, the regulation was controversial when it was enacted 
in 1992 and it remains so even though the regulation was slightly relaxed at the end of 2006.  The 
government also regulates prices of popular items sold in convenience stores like milk and beer 
and that too is controversial.   
The reasons motivating government intervention are similar to those justifying 
interventions to slow down the erosion in the number of small farms.  As for the number of 
farms, it looks like the number of small retailers will continue to fall as new large players enter 
the market and changes in technology keeps on favoring larger stores.  Thus, the eventual arrival 
of Walmart’s supercentres in Quebec would reduce the demand for “convenience”, but it would 
be welfare-enhancing.  We show that the margin of small retailers gets squeezed in the presence 
of a minimum retail price. The price level in large stores also tends to increase, thus reducing 
consumer surplus and welfare.  Furthermore, a regulation that artificially increases the marginal 
retail cost of large retail outlets reduces welfare. Its effect on the small retailers’ margin is 
ambiguous.  Several of our results about large and small retailers depend on the technology used 
in distribution. This highlights the importance of vertical linkages in the analysis of regulations at 
a given level in the marketing chain.  Finally, given that the two regulations analyzed decrease 
welfare and may even have a perverse effect on the small retailers’ margin, we are left wondering 
about the raison d’être of these regulations. Quebec’s regulation restricting the colour of   27
margarine was just abolished (July 2008) and perhaps this will mark a new “no non-sense” 
approach to food policy and regulations.  
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Figure 1. Sales by integrated retailers and small retailers sharing same technology 
 
















Figure 2. Cost increases associated with a constraint on the number of employees   31
 












Figure 3. Regulation-induced cost increases, welfare and the number of firms  32
8. TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
 
Appendix 1: 
Totally differentiating the first order conditions of a given distributor i yields the following: 
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 The second order condition requires that the determinant of the first matrix be positive, hence 
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2 22 2 2 0 Hf B f d b f γδ ≡ − + + ++ ++ >. Subscripts and summations can be dispensed 
with under the symmetry assumption (i.e.,  ,; ij qq i qn q = ∀= ∑ ) and comparative statics can be 
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9. ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 See http://www.radio-canada.ca/actualite/lepicerie/docArchives/2004/02/12/enquete.shtml for more information.  
 
2 For more details see for example: http://www.radio-canada.ca/nouvelles/Economie-Affaires/2006/09/07/004-
epiciers-heures-quebec.shtml. 
 
3 The fines for first-time, second-time and third-time offenders are $1500, $6000 and $9000 respectively.  It has also 
been reported that some employees have been asked to work in plain clothes to minimize suspicion.  See 
http://lapresseaffaires.cyberpresse.ca/article/20080320/LAINFORMER/80320205/5891/LAINFORMER01 for more 
details.   
 
4 Several authors have worked on the pro and anti-competitive effects of deeper vertical integration.  The interested 
reader is referred to Salinger (1988), Perry (1978, 1989), Ordover et.al. (1990), Hart and Tirole (1990) and Riordan 
and Salop (1995). 
 
5 The market shares of Loblaws, Metro and Sobeys were 33%, 27% and 18% respectively in 2002.  For more details, 
see http://www.mapaq.gouv.qc.ca/Fr/md/statistiques/distribution/. Costco is also a player in the Quebec food market, 
but its share is conjectured to be around 6%.  The market has changed radically since the 1970s when Steinberg was 
the dominant firm competing against A&P Canada who owned Dominion and A&P stores and Metro, Provigo and 
IGA who were small players then.  Steinberg went from a small family business to a huge empire under the 
management of Sam Steinberg. A family feud over his succession brought about the demise of the company whose 
stores ended up in the hands of fast-growing Provigo and Metro in 1992, who in turn subsequently sold a few stores 
to IGA to appease competition concerns.  Provigo was purchased by Loblaw Companies Limited in 1998 and Metro 
bought A&P Canada in 2005 from The Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Company, a German-owned retailer based in 
the United States.         
 
6 See http://www.mapaq.gouv.qc.ca/Fr/md/statistiques/distribution/ 
7 Wal-Mart spokesman Yanik Deschênes said in a recent interview that none of the new supercentres would open in 
Quebec because of logistical and marketing reasons.  Wal-Mart hasn't yet brought its supercentre concept to Quebec, 
because the company doesn't have a distribution centre in the province. Wal-Mart is still getting used to catering to 
Canadian customers, who have different tastes from the company's U.S. shoppers. Quebec consumers, shop 
differently than customers in the rest of Canada. "Before launching in Quebec we'd have to adjust our offering," he 
said (Montreal Gazette, May 9, 2008).  
8  See http://www.metro.ca/corpo/profil-corpo/historique/2003.en.html. 
 
9 The North American couche-tard network is made up of over 5000 stores located in 6 Canadian provinces, 25 US 
states.  See http://www.couche-tard.com/en/entreprise/profile.html. 
 
10 See p.9 of Loblaws 2005 annual report at http://www.loblaw.ca/en/inv_ar.html# 
 
11 See http://www.statcan.ca/english/research/11-621-MIE/11-621-MIE2006038.htm.  
 
12 Let P  and r  be the prices at which downstream firms sell their output to consumers and purchase their inputs 
from a sole upstream supplier whose cost of production is  ( ) Cx.  One unit of output requires one unit of input and 
the processing cost is c, a constant.  The problem of the upstream firm can be written as: 
() () .. Max rx C x st P x r c ℑ= − = + .  The resulting behavioural rule,  '0 PP xcC ′ + −− =, turns out to be the same 
as that of an integrated firm maximizing  ( ) ( ) P xx c x Cx −− .  See also Chung’s (1984) proposition 1. 
 
13 In fact, this is also the case in Quirmbach (1992), even though the downstream production is done with a 
technology giving rise to a U-shaped average cost curve.   34
                                                                                                                                                              
 
14 The hypothesis that each type of stores sells a unique product allows us to make our arguments in the simplest 
manner.  Large grocery stores sell thousands of products, but because the product offering of large stores does not 
change much from store to store, our assumption is not that heroic.  McAfee (2002, chap.11) also assumes product 
homogeneity to analyze price dispersion (and mixed equilibrium strategies) at the food retail level.     
 
15 Our modelling of the small retailers is inspired from Salop and Scheffman (1987) who did not explicitly introduce 
the number of firms in the competitive fringe.   
 
16 As in Salop and Scheffman (1987) and Riordan (1998) monopoly models, the small downstream firms have an 
upward-sloping supply curve, which gives rise to rents.   i K can be thought as a franchise fee, as in Tirole (1988, 
p.176), and we assume that it is used by the distributors to extract all of the rents generated by the small retailers, that 









= , which is obtained by inserting the small retailers’ supply function into the 
expression for profit.      
 
17 The model is general enough to admit no integration and full integration cases by middling with the costs 
parameters but these corner solutions are of meager interest in the present case. 
 
18  To counter the downward rigidity of prices, supermarkets frequently advertise that they sell milk at the minimum 
prices allowed by the law.  See http://www.amdeq.ca/Fichiers%20PDF/Num%E9ro%2010%20TU.pdf 
 
19 Besides the competition argument, it is alleged that higher minimum beer prices could alleviate financial pressures 
on the public health care costs and on the no-fault government car insurance program. See 
http://www.amdeq.ca/Fichiers%20PDF/Num%E9ro%209%20TU.pdf 
 